First-order languages have been introduced to describe beliefs formally and the concept of revision is defined for model as well as proof. A logical inference system named R-calculus is defined to derive all maximal contractions of a base of belief set for its given refutations. The R-calculus consists of the structural rules, an axiom, a cut rule and the rules for logical connectives and quantifiers. Some examples are given to demonstrate how to use the R-calculus. Furthermore, the properties reachability, soundness and completeness of the R-calculus are formally defined and proved.
MOTIVATION
In 1985, Gärdenfors and his colleagues introduced their theory of changes [1] , called the AGM theory, which addressed the following three concepts: expansion, contraction and revision. The AGM theory focuses on building axiomatic systems of postulates for expansion, contraction and revision, and studies the properties of these systems; for example, the rationality of their postulates [2, 3] . Since then many research results have been produced and published. In particular, a large volume of work on natural deduction for belief revision and non-monotonic reasoning appeared in the 1990s, for example [4] and on dynamic epistemic logic [5, 6] . There are also some articles on proof theory of non-monotonic reasoning by using sequence or tableaux, such as [7] .
A basic problem of the AGM theory is how to accomplish a task: "A new sentence that is inconsistent with a belief system K is added, but in order to maintain consistency in the resulting belief system, some of old sentences in K are deleted" [2] . The aim of this article is to solve this problem on basis of only the syntax and semantics of classical first-order logic. To accomplish this task, we need to formally introduce a special kind of contraction called maximal contraction. EXAMPLE 1.1. Consider a base of belief set [3] G as below:
G :¼ fw; w . c; c . x; a . bg where w, c, x, a and b are sentences that can be interpreted as some equations or laws, for example, in some knowledge bases or specifications of software systems.
It is not difficult to know that x is a logical consequence of G. Suppose that some facts and evidences force us to believe : x, that is, we have to reject x and accept : x. Under such circumstances, the sentence : x which is inconsistent with the belief system G, is added, and we know that in order to maintain consistency in the resulting belief system, the old sentence in G, such as c . x or w . c or w should be deleted, and the corresponding maximal subset of G which is consistent with : x should be: L 1 :¼ fw; w . c; a . bg or L 2 :¼ fw; c . x; a . bg or L 3 :¼ fw . c; c . x; a . bg:
We call each a maximal contraction of G with respect to :x. And then :x should be added and the final revised belief system of G with respect to :x should be: For the above example, we would ask the following questions: why is x in the above example a logical consequence of G? Why does c . x, w . c or w make g inconsistent with :x, respectively, and should it be deleted from G? Is there a formal inference system that can deduce L 1 , L 2 and L 3 formally? And if so, are the systems sound and complete? The goal of this article is to answer these questions.
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This article has the following three main goals. The first is to introduce formally the concept of logical consequence of a given base of belief set, which involves the logical inference system G as well as its soundness and completeness borrowed from the first-order logic [8] . The second goal is to introduce the concept of maximal contraction, and to build a formal inference system for conducting belief revision in the first-order logic. We call this system R-calculus. Using this calculus, all maximal contractions can be derived formally from a given base of belief set G with respect to its refutation by facts w. Some examples are given to show the applications of the R-calculus. The third goal is to prove the reachability, soundness and completeness of the R-calculus.
This article consists of eight sections. First-order languages are introduced to describe beliefs in Sections 1 and 2. In Section 3, A Gentzen style of inference system G is given that provides the logical proofs for the beliefs. In Section 4, the concept of necessary antecedent of a logical consequence is defined; which is indispensable to defining the cut rule of the R-calculus. The corresponding model of the theoretical concept of revision, which is called refutation by fact, is given in Section 5. The Rrefutation and R-calculus are defined in Section 6. The Rcalculus consists of an R-axiom, the structural rules, R-cut rule and rules for logical connective symbols and quantifier symbols. Some examples are given in Section 7 to demonstrate the applications of the R-calculus. The reachability, soundness and completeness of R-calculus are proved in Section 8. Finally, the future research problems are discussed in Section 9.
A FORMAL LANGUAGE FOR BELIEFS
First-order languages are chosen to be the formal language to describe beliefs [8] . Briefly, a first-order language L has two sets of symbol strings: a set of terms and a set of beliefs. The terms are used to describe constants and functions used in beliefs. They are ranged t 1 , t 2 , . . . , and are defined on the set of variable symbols V ranged x, y, z, . . . , the set of function symbols F ranged f, g, h, . . . , and the set of constant symbols C ranged a, b, c, . . . . The set of terms is defined inductively as below:
The beliefs of L are used to describe the laws, rules, principles or axioms in knowledge bases or specifications. The beliefs of L are ranged w, x, c, . . . , and are defined on the set of predicate symbols P ranged P, Q, R, . . . ; equality symbol 8; the set of logical connective symbols including :,^, _, .; and the set of the quantifiers 8, 9. The set of beliefs L is defined inductively as follows:
w ::¼ t 1 8 t 2 j Pðt 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t n Þ j :c j w^c j w _ c j w . c j 8xw j 9xw:
A belief is called closed if there does not exist free variables in it. A belief is called atomic if it is a closed predicate (t 1 8 t 2 is treated as a predicate).
In this article, the concept of consistency of first-order languages are used for the set of beliefs and finite formal theories of first-order languages ( [8] ) are used to describe the bases of belief sets. DEFINITION 2.1. A finite consistent set G of beliefs is called a base of a belief set, or a base for simplicity. The beliefs contained in G are called laws of the base.
It should be noted that a base of a belief set is a finite formal theory of L, which can be used to describe a knowledge base, a specification of a software system or an algorithm. EXAMPLE 2.1. Some bases of belief sets are given below:
G : fw; w . c; c . x; a . bg D : fx; w; 8xðw . cðxÞÞg Q : fa½c; 8xðaðxÞ . bðxÞÞg
The following finite set of beliefs f f ðxÞ 8 y; f ðyÞ 8 z; :ð f ð f ðxÞÞ 8 zÞg;
is not a base since it is not consistent.
A model M is a pair kM, Il. M is called the domain of M, which is a non-empty set. I is called the interpretation of M, which is a mapping from L to M. The form M o w means that for the given domain M and the interpretation I, w is
Finally, w is called a logical consequence of G and is written as G o w, if and only if for every M, if M o G holds, then M o w holds.
A LOGICAL INFERENCE SYSTEM FOR BELIEFS
A Gentzen style logical inference system G is given in this section, which is a modified version of the inference system given in [8] . It is used for the formal deductive reasoning of beliefs. The system G is built on sequents. A sequent is formed as G r D, where G and D could be any finite set of beliefs. G is called the antecedent of the sequent, D is called the succedent of the sequent and r denotes the deductive relation [8, 9] . The system G consists of an axiom, the rules for logical connective symbols, rules for quantifier symbols and cut rule. G is given as below: DEFINITION 3.1. Let G, D, L, Q be sets of beliefs, and w be a belief. The following sequent G; w; D r L; w; Q; is called the logical axiom of G.
The above logical axiom means that if a belief appears in the succedent of the sequent as well as its antecedent, then the sequent holds without any proof.
The _-L rule means that to prove G, w _ c, D r L holds, we must prove that both G, w, D r L and G, c, D r L holds and vice versa. The _-R rule means that to prove G r L, w _ c, Q holds, we must prove that G r L, w, c, Q holds and vice versa. In general, a rule of G is formed as a fraction. To prove that the sequent occurring in its denominator holds, we must prove that the sequents (one or two) occurring in its numerator holds and vice versa. For simplicity, we will not repeat the explanation here for _-L rule and _-R rule.
G r L; w½t=x; 9xwðxÞ; Q G r L; 9xwðxÞ; Q In the rules 8-R and 9-L, y is a 'new' variable. Here 'new' means y is different from the variables contained in G, L, D and w. y is formally called an Eigen-variable. In the rules 8-L and 9-R, the term t can be any term, but the condition x Ó FV (t) must be satisfied.
The beliefs w^c, w _ c, w . c, :w, 8xw(x) and 9xw(x) in the denominators of the rules of the system G are called principal beliefs [8] , and w, c, w[t/x], w[y/x] in the numerators of the corresponding rules are called side beliefs. In general, a principal belief is the one that appears in the denominator and is to be decomposed, and a side belief is the one that appears in the numerator of the same rule and is the sub-belief after the decomposition.
The above cut rule can be derived from other rules in the system G [8] . Since in many cases it is convenient to construct formal proofs using the cut rule, it is adopted as a rule in the system G.
It should be mentioned that the^-L rule and the _-R rule tell us that in the sequent w 1 , . . . , w m r c 1 , . . . , c n , the commas on the left hand side of r can be viewed as^, and the commas on the right hand side of r can be viewed as _.
Strictly speaking, the beliefs w and c in the rules of G are not some particular beliefs in a language L, but they are kinds of variables that can be substituted by beliefs, and they are different from the variables of L because they cannot be substituted by terms. In this sense, every rule of G is a scheme. When we apply the rules, w and c must be substituted by the beliefs defined in L, and G, D, L and Q must be substituted by belief sets. The rules obtained after the substitutions are called applications of the rules.
A proof of a given sequent G r w is a finite tree T. Each node of T and its direct sons form an application of an inference rule of the system G. The root of T is G r w, and every leaf of T is an application of the axiom of G. The tree T is x; w; 8xðw . cðxÞÞ r 9xcðxÞ
Let us explain the above proof tree in a bottom-up manner while disregarding the superscripts at this moment, such as the numbers and * in some beliefs, which will be explained in the next section.
The first node is an application of the 9-R rule. The second node is an application of the 8-L rule. The third node of the proof tree is an application of .-L rule. Both the last two nodes are applications of the axiom. EXAMPLE 3.2. Consider the sequent a, a . b, b . g r g. It is proved by the following proof tree.
The first node is an application of the .-L rule whose principal belief is b . g. The numerator consists of two parts. The first part is a sub-tree T 1 as above. The second node is also an application of the .-L rule whose principal belief is a . b. The leaves of the tree are applications of the axiom.
Finally, it is assumed in this article that two beliefs a and b are treated as the same belief if and only if a ; b; that is, (a . b)^(b . a) is a tautology.
NECESSARY ANTECEDENTS
The concept of necessary antecedents plays an important role in the R-calculus. DEFINITION 4.1. Let G r x be proved by the proof tree T. Let a, b and g be beliefs occurring in T. a is an antecedent of b, if the following conditions hold: Let P T (G, w) be the set of antecedents of w in the proof tree T of G r w. If a [ G and a is an antecedent of w in T for G r w, more precisely, a [ G > P T ðG; wÞ holds, then a is called a necessary antecedent of w in T of G r w, and is written as a 7 ! T w.
According to Definition 4.1, for any given G r w, the necessary antecedents of w depend on the proof tree T of G r w. Whenever Gw holds, its proof tree exists. *1 on the righthand side. Thus, the set of antecedents in the proof tree T is fc½t=x; 8xðw , cðxÞÞ; w , c½t=x; wg:
According to Definition 4.1, the necessary antecedents of 9xc(x) of the sequents x, w, 8x(w . c(x))9xc(x) in the proof tree T are:
fw; 8xðw , cðxÞÞg: EXAMPLE 4.3. Consider the sequent a, a . b, b . g r g whose proof tree is given in Example 3.2. g *1 stands for the logical consequence g on the right side of r in the denominator. According to the third law of Definition 4.1, the antecedents of g *1 in T are
Similarly, the antecedents of b *2 in the application of the .-L rule (2) are
According to the first law of Definition 4.1, a is an antecedent of a *3
. As a result, the antecedents of g in T are
Finally, according to Definition 4.1, the necessary antecedents of g in T are
fa; a , b; b , gg:
LEMMA 4.1. If G r w is proved by the proof tree T, then the set P T (G, w) is decidable [10] .
Proof. According to the definition of necessary antecedents, a procedure can be designed in the following way. Its input is the proof tree, and its output is the set P T (G, w). The procedure counts the antecedents from the root of T to the leaves of T as shown in Example 3.1. Since the proof tree T is finite, the procedure halts. A
REFUTATION BY FACTS
A law of a base of a belief set should be rejected whenever there is a counter example contradicting with this law. This phenomenon can be defined in a theoretical model as below [11] . 
The above definition describes the following situation that although G r w holds, there is a counter example M making :w true. G M(w) is a subset of G that does not contradict :w. The refutation by facts coincides with the intuition that whether a base is accepted depends only on whether its logical consequences agree with the facts or counter examples. The ideal refutation by facts agrees with the Occam's Razor, which says: Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity [12] . Here it means that if a logical consequence w deduced from a base G is refuted by the facts or counter examples, then all the maximal subsets of the base consistent with :w must be retained and assumed to be true in the current stage of the development of the base. Nevertheless, the rest of the law contained in the base G must be deleted because they lead to contradictions.
In the rest of the article, we consider ideal refutation by facts only and simply call them refutation by facts. Sometimes we say that :w is a refutation by facts of G which means that G r w holds and there is an ideal refutation by facts M satisfying M o :w. DEFINITION 5.2. Let G r w and L , G. L is called a maximal contraction of G by :w if it is a maximal subset of G that is consistent with :w.
Let R(G, w) be the class of all the maximal contractions of G with respect to :w. EXAMPLE 5.1. Let G: ¼ fw, w . c, c . x, a . bg. It can be proved that G r x holds. Let :x be a refutation by facts. It can be verified that there are three maximal contractions: fw, w . c, a . bg, fw, c . x, a . bg and fw . c, c . x, a . bg. The maximal contraction given here is a theoretical proof concept, and is a special kind of contraction given by AGM in [1 -3] . The refutation by facts is the corresponding theoretical model concept of the maximal contractions [11, 13] .
R-CALCULUS
The purpose of this section is to build an inference system to delete the laws that are not consistent with a given refutation by facts from a base. The inference system is0 named as Rcalculus. For a given G r w and a refutation by facts :w, the R-calculus will be used to derive all the maximal contractions of G with respect to :w. Even if G is not consistent, the R-calculus can still be used to derive all the maximal subsets of G that are consistent with :w.
The following concept is needed to define the R-calculus. It is called the R-refutation of G which is a kind of 'antisymmetric' to the concept of T-condition in forcing theory [14] . For the simplicity of representing the rules of R-calculus, the bases D and G will be written as sequences of laws. For example, fw, cg < D 1 and fw, cg < G 1 will be written as w, c, D 1 and w, c, G 0 , respectively. 
means that D j w, G is transformed to D j G with w being deleted during the R-transition.
The R-calculus consists of four kinds of transformation rules. They are the structural rules, R-axiom, R-cut rule and R-rules of logical connective symbols and quantifier symbols. It should be mentioned that the R-cut rule given below depends on the concept of necessary antecedents which further depends on proof trees.
Let G be a set of beliefs and D be a finite consistent set of atomic beliefs and the negation of atomic beliefs. The rules of the R-calculus are defined as below.
Structural rules
The contraction rules mean that the identical beliefs on one side of R-configuration can be contracted to one belief. The exchange rules mean that a belief can be freely shifted within the same side of an R-configuration. DEFINITION 6.5.
The R-axiom means that if w, an atomic belief or the negation of an atomic belief, occurs on the left-hand side of j with its negation :w occurring on the right-hand side of j , then :w must be deleted. DEFINITION 6.6. R-cut rule
In the numerator of the R-cut rule, the R-transformation D j x, G 2 ¼) D j G 2 means that the belief x is not consistent Page 6 of 13 WEI LI with D and should be deleted. The sequents G 1 , w c and c, G 2 r x mean that c is a lemma used in the proof of G 1 , w, G 2 r x. w 7 ! T c means that w is a necessary antecedent of c with respect to T which is a proof tree of G 1 , w r c. The R-cut rule means that if all of the conditions in the numerator hold, then w must be deleted.
Logical rules
Let us explain the first rule. w occurring in the numerator of the R-^rule means that D r :w holds and w should be deleted. According to the _-rule of the system G, D r :w _ :c holds, that is, D r :(w^c) holds. Therefore if w should be deleted, then w^c must be deleted. Similarly, for the second rule, if c is deleted, then w^c should also be deleted.
Since w and c occur in the numerator of the R-_ rule and will be deleted, D r :w and D r :c hold. According to thê -rule of the system G, D r :w _ :c holds, which further implies D r :(w _ c). Therefore w _ c must be deleted. DEFINITION 6.9. R-. rule
The R-. rule holds since (w . c) ; (:w _ c).
where t is a term and is free in w for x.
Since w[t/x] in the numerator of the R-8 rule will be deleted, This rule means that if w is a composite belief, and w 0 , which is a decomposition of w with respect to ':' and is equivalent to w is to be deleted, then w must be deleted. DEFINITION 6.13. An R-configuration D j G is called an R-termination if there does not exist an R-rule that can be applied to D j G excepting the structural rules.
SOME EXAMPLES
The following five examples show how the R-calculus can be used to delete the laws of G that are not consistent with its refutation by facts. EXAMPLE 7.1. Using the R-calculus, we can prove formally that Einstein's approach [15] to discover the special theory of relativity is correct.
Suppose R stands for the Galilean Principle of Relativity; N 1 , N 2 , N 3 stand for Newton's three laws of motion; E stands for Newton's law of gravitation. Let a(x) stand for 'x is a mass' and b(x) stand for 'if the velocity of x relative to a coordinate system K isṽ 1 and the velocity of a coordinate system K 0 relative to the coordinate system K isṽ 2 , then the velocity of x relative to the coordinate system K By his excellent intuition of logical revision, Einstein decided to delete Galilean transformation from classical mechanics, and add the law of invariability of the velocity of light as well as the Lorentz transformation into mechanics. By doing so, he created his special relativity theory.
Using R-calculus, we can prove that Einstein's decision of giving up Galilean transformation is correct. Let In fact, each of the above three maximal contractions can be derived by the R-calculus. Consider the first one fw, w . c, a . bg. Let
By the G system, both
x r x and x; G2 r x hold. According to Definition 4.1, c . x is an antecedent of x and c . x is in G, thus c . x is a necessary antecedent of x, that is, c . x 7 ! x holds. Furthermore,
Page 8 of 13 WEI LI holds by the R-axiom. Then the R-cut rule is applied and
holds. Here G 1 , G 2 is just fw, w . c, a . bg. Consider the second maximal contraction fw, c . x, a . bg. Let
By the G system, G 1 ; w . c r c and c; G 2 r x hold. Notice that w . c is an antecedent of c and is in G. Thus, w . c 7 ! c holds. According to the R-axiom,
holds. Thus the R-cut rule is applied and
holds. Here G 1 , G 2 is f w, c . x, a . bg. Finally, let
Using a similar proof strategy, the third maximal contraction fw . c,c . x, a . bg can be derived by the R-calculus.
This example shows that in principle, the revision of all the knowledge bases written by Prolog can be accomplished by the R-calculus.
In the above two examples, G is a finite consistent set of beliefs. The following example shows that even if G is not consistent, the R-calculus still works to derive all the maximal subsets of G that are consistent with D.
Obviously G is not consistent. But the R-cut rule can still be applied to derive all the maximal subsets which are consistent with D. For example, let Similarly, both ff(x) 8 y, f(y) 8 zg and ff(y) 8 z, : (f(f(x)) 8 z)g can be derived by the R-calculus. In the beginning of the article, we mentioned that the goal of the R-calculus is, for any given regular R-configuration D j G, to delete all the beliefs which are contained in G and are not consistent with D. This example shows that R-calculus still works to derive every maximal contraction of G even if G is not consistent. EXAMPLE 7.5. Let G be f:w^cg and D be fwg. Thus G 0 r :w holds. According to the R-^rule, we have
Let G 0 be f:w, cg and D still be fwg. According to the R-axiom, we have
The above two R-transitions seem to show that the Rcalculus is not correct, since we usually believe that the base f:w^cg and the base f:w, cg should be the same, and thus the results of the R-transitions should also be the same. In fact, the R-calculus is still correct in this circumstance. The reason is that the first base contains a single law and the belief :w^c is not consistent with w. Therefore it should be deleted. But as a base, f:w,cg is different from f:w^cg because it contains two laws and only the first law :w is not consistent with w. This example shows that as a base, f:w, cg is better than f:w^cg. The fewer logical connective symbol '^' used in a base, the better it is.
REACHABILITY, SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS
From the examples given in the previous section, we can see that for a given base G and its R-refutation D, every maximal contraction of G with respect to D can be derived by the R-calculus. This property is called the reachability of the R-calculus. sequence such that
holds, and D j G 0 is an R-termination.
LEMMA 8.1. Let G be a finite set of beliefs and D be a finite consistent set of atomic beliefs and the negation of atomic beliefs. If G 0 is a maximal contraction of G with respect to D, then there exists a sequence of R-transitions such that
00
, c is deleted by the R-calculus. To do so, let G 1 :¼ G 00 2 fcg and G 2 :
First, G 1 , c r c holds and its proof tree T is a single node. Secondly, the c on the left-hand side of is a necessary antecedent of c on the right-hand side of r with respect to T. Since G 2 is a maximal subset of G which is consistent with D, by the definition, G 2 , c r :(w 1^. ..^w n ) holds. Furthermore,
can be obtained by applying the R-axiom, R-_ and R-: rules. Finally, applying the R-cut rule, we can obtain
The above R-transition means that c is deleted. Every belief contained in G 00 can be deleted by the R-calculus in the same way as above. Therefore
The converse of the lemma is not true. There do exist some sequences of R-transitions
where D 0 j G 0 is an R-termination but G 0 is not a maximal contraction of G with respect to D. Consider the following example. EXAMPLE 8.1. Let G: ¼ fw, w . c, c . x, w . a, a . xg. G r x holds. Suppose that x is rejected by facts. Using the R-cut rule, we can delete w . c. And since w; w , a; a , x r x; we apply the R-cut rule again to delete w. Thus we have fc , x; w , a; a , xg:
The above base of the belief set is not a maximal contraction of G with respect to :x, since the maximal contraction is fw , c; c , x; w , a; a , xg: LEMMA 8.2. Let D j G be an R-configuration and D be a base which consists of atomic beliefs and the negation of atomic beliefs. If G is consistent with D, then D j G is an R-termination.
Proof. The proof is divided into two parts. In the first part, we will prove that if an application of an R-rule has the following form 
we will prove that the consistency of D, G implies the consistency of D, G 1 . It should be mentioned that in the following proof, all the symbols used are the same symbols as in Definition 6.4-6.12.
(i) R-cut rule. Suppose D is not consistent with fxg < G 2 .
Then D, x, G 2 r :x is provable. According to the :-R rule, D, G 2 r :x is provable. So D, G 1 , w, G 2 r :x is also provable. Because both G 1 , w r c and G 2 , c r x hold in the condition of the R-cut rule, D, G 1 , w, G 2 r x is provable by the cut-rule of G. In the second part, we will prove that if D is consistent with G, then no belief in G can be deleted. Suppose a belief c [ G can be deleted. Let G 0 : ¼ G 2 fcg, then there must be a proof tree T for the R-transition
According to the above property we proved in the first part, there must be a path from the root of T to a leaf of T such that for each node
n of the path, D and G n are consistent including the leaf node in the path. This contradicts that the leaf of T must be an application of the R-axiom rule. Thus no belief in G can be deleted.
Finally, since the applications of R-rules except Rstructure rules lead to deletion of belief in G, only R-structure rules can be applied to D j G, that is, D j G is an R-termination. A THEOREM 8.1. The R-calculus is reachable.
Proof. Let D j G be a given regular R-configuration, where G is a finite set of beliefs and D is an R-refutation of G. Let G 0 be a maximal contraction of G with respect to D. According to Lemma 8.1, we obtain the following sequence of R-transitions:
where D j G 0 is an R-termination by Lemma 8.
A
The soundness and completeness of R-calculus are defined and proved as below. DEFINITION 8.2. The R-calculus is sound if for every Rtransition sequence
where w j G is a regular R-configuration and G 0 is a maximal contraction of G with respect to w, there exists an ideal refutation by facts M of G with respect to w such that
Proof. By the definition of the ideal refutation by facts and the reachablility. A DEFINITION 8.3. Let w j G be a given regular Rconfiguration. The R-calculus is complete if for every ideal refutation by facts M of G with respect to w, there exists an Rtransition sequence Following the way that AGM defined their operators þ, _ À, and _ þ, we define the following three similar but different operatorsþ, À, and þ. To do so, let us define an equivalent relation with respect to a base G and a belief w. ! G,w is an equivalence relation.
Proof. It should be proved that the relation ! G,w is reflective, symmetric and transitive. These are obvious since the membership relation is an equivalence relation. A Let L (G, w) represent the class R(G, w). Based on the maximal contractions given in this paper, we define three operatorsþ, À, and þ explicitly as follows. Proof. The lemma is deduced directly from the above definition. A It should be mentioned that the main difference between the operators þ, _ À and _ þ defined by AGM and the operators defined aboveþ, À, and þ is the following: the operators þ, _ À and _ þ deal with the logical closures of belief sets which sometimes are not consistent sets of beliefs, whereas in contrast, the operatorsþ, À, and þ deal with the bases of belief sets which are finite and consistent sets of beliefs. In addition, G Àw is a representative of the class consisting of all the maximal subsets of G which are consistent with w. In contrast, G _ Àw is a belief set which is consistent with :w.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the R-calculus is a set of inference rules which consists of the structural rules, R-axiom, R-cut rule and R-rules for logical connective symbols and R-rules for quantifier symbols. Every R-configuration D j G consists of two parts: the left part D is a finite consistent set of atomic beliefs and the negations of atomic beliefs and the right part G is a finite set of sentences which may not be consistent. For some w [ D, w is a refutation by facts of G. The Rcalculus is used to delete those beliefs which are not consistent with D. The principles of deletion are: an atomic belief or its negation w of G on the right-hand side of j is deleted if its negation :w is in D. If the belief w contained in G is a composite belief, then whether w is deleted depends on the deletions of the components of w as well as the meaning of the logical connective symbols and the quantifier symbols of w. The rule for a logical connective symbol of the R-calculus is antisymmetric to the right rule for the same logical connective symbol of the first-order inference system G. The reachability, soundness and completeness of the R-calculus are proved. In general, beliefs are used to describe knowledge bases and specifications for software systems. In the axiomatization process of complex knowledge bases or specifications, which contain, for example, millions of laws or statements, it is difficult for each version G to maintain consistency, let alone to meet the requirements of clients. In practice, the revision of G is usually accomplished by testing, i.e. using some well-designed testing samples to check whether it is consistent and whether G meets the requirements. If G fails the testing, then it is a difficult and arduous job to accomplish the revision of G. From the theoretical point of view, the testing samples can be described by a finite consistent set D of atomic beliefs and the negation of atomic beliefs. In this situation, the revision of G is deleting all the beliefs of G which are inconsistent with D. The theorem of reachability shows that this work of deletion can be accomplished by the R-calculus. In other words, revisions for knowledge bases and software systems by testing can be formalized and accomplished by the R-calculus, a formal calculus based only on the syntax and semantics of the classical first-order logic.
A preliminary version of the R-calculus was introduced by the author in 1994 [13] , in which an R-configuration has a form D j G where D is a finite consistent set of beliefs that might contain disjunctions of beliefs. Under such circumstances, for every logical connective symbols and quantifier symbols, there should be one left rule and one right rule in the R-calculus, just as the system G does. For example, the left rule of the logical connective symbolĉ an be represented as:
Since the A^B on the left-hand side of ¼) is equivalent to the A, B on the right-hand side, the meaning of D is unchanged after the transition. The difficulty is how to construct the left rule for the disjunction of two beliefs such as A _ B. For example, the left rule could have been formed as:
The meaning of the left-hand side of the first R-transition is 'A _ B has to be accepted', whereas the meaning of the righthand side of the transition ¼) is changed to 'A has to be accepted'. In other words, the meaning of the transformed R-refutation has been changed, or the refutations by facts are changed by the R-transition.
Then what is the correct form of the left rule for _? Up to now, the author has not found a simple and correct solution. Inspired by the forcing method of defining the T-condition D which can be atomic beliefs, the negation of atomic beliefs and their conjunctions excluding the cases of disjunctions [14] , the author defined the R-refutation and introduced it into the R-calculus. The advantage is to ensure the correctness of the R-calculus rules and prove its reachability, soundness and completeness. The first attempt of using this idea is in the article [16] for specification development.
Finally, it is believed that using the methods given in [9] , certain proper mechanism of type theories based on the R-calculus can be constructed and the corresponding interactive tools can be implemented to revise the bases of belief sets or knowledge bases. 
